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Abstract—We propose various logical semantics for change
of awareness. The setting is that of multiple agents that may
become aware of facts or other agents, or forget about them. We
model these dynamics by quantifying over propositional vari-
ables and agent variables, in a multi-agent epistemic language
with awareness operators, employing a notion of bisimulation
with a clause for ‘same awareness’. The quantification is over
all different ways in which an agent can become aware (or
forget). Logics for change of awareness combine well with logics
for informational change, as when a public announcement
simultaneously makes you aware of an issue (‘a plane just
crashed on Schiphol Airport’).
Keywords-awareness; knowledge; dynamics; multi-agent sys-
tems
I. INTRODUCTION
Becoming aware of facts: When modelling uncertainty
in a multi-agent system you only pay attention to the relevant
facts. You may then become aware of more facts, and
integrate those in the system: a refinement operation. It is
not obvious how to do this in epistemic logic! For example,
when an agent i is uncertain of the value of some fact (atom
/ propositional variable) p, a two-state structure suffices to
represent that uncertainty where p is true in one state and p
is false in another state, namely as follows:
¬p pii i
It may now occur that subsequent information about the
agent’s uncertainty comes to light. Apart from fact p, another
fact q is also relevant—the modeller and curiously enough
also the agent become aware of q. One way in which the
agent may become aware of q is as follows:
¬p¬q p¬q
¬pq
i
i i
i i
i
We would like to have a logical operation describing this
transition. But here we have a problem. A logic for such
transitions would have background paramaters ‘set of propo-
sitional variables’ (facts) and ‘set of agent variables’, both in
the language and in the structures on which the language is
interpreted. The first figure is then slightly informal in that
no value for q is given in the states. For example, q may be
true in both states. That choice would make the transition
to the resulting figure very unsatisfactory: the agent would
initially know that q—we should apparently ignore that but
how?—and after becoming aware of q it no longer knows
q. Any other choice for the initial values of q would create
a similar conflict! The solution is to regard the initial values
of q as ‘don’t care’: something the agent is unaware of.
The transition can then be visualized as in Figure 1—what
the agent is unaware of is between parentheses, the other
transition is explained later. We propose a logic (i) in which
¬p¬q p¬q
¬pq
i
i i
i i
i
¬p(q) p(q)ii i
agent i becomes aware of fact q
agent i forgets fact q
Figure 1. Agent i becomes aware of or forgets fact q
the value of q is initially irrelevant, i.e., something the agent
is unaware of; (ii) in which the depicted transition makes the
agent aware of q, wherein any increased structure expressing
uncertainty about q is allowed; and (iii) in which the agent
is then aware of q.
Comparison to standard research on awareness: Static
awareness in our approach is according to the semantically
flavoured proposals by [2], [3], [4]—the extraordinarily rich
and exceptionally well-written [2] certainly inspired us along
our chosen path. (There is no relation between our ap-
proach and syntactically flavoured proposals for awareness,
that model ‘limited rationality’ of agents, such as another
approach also pursued in [2] and recent work like [5],
[6].) Dynamic awareness is modelled by a bisimulation
quantification on structures incorporating awareness, over
the variable expressing the newly relevant fact. For bisim-
ulation quantification see [7], [8], this concerns a further
generalization of propositional quantification a` la Fine [9].
We think that our ideas on dynamic awareness are novel.
We are newcomers in the area of awareness logics, and have
studied some of the (even) more recent literature on the topic
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[10], [11], [12]. Only Hill’s [11] addresses the dynamics of
awareness, but rather different from ours: there, the result
of becoming aware of a new fact should be ignorance about
that fact. On the other hand...: comparison of different levels
of awareness is quite standard in the literature—merely not
having dynamic operations to go from one to another level.
It is remarkable that the relation between the different static
ways of unawareness in Heifetz et al.’s [4] can just as well
be described in terms of bisimulation quantification. For
example, take S{p} and S{p,q} in their Figure 2 [4, p.86]:
S{p,q} sums up all different ways in which an agent only
aware of p, as in S{p}, can become aware of q (and our
running example, above, can indeed be found among those).
The notion of bisimulation seems a more succinct, technical
tool to express the same. But it inspired our research to see
this correspondence with the acclaimed [4].
Forgetting facts: Apart from becoming aware of a
fact, the agent may become unaware of a fact. This can
be for voluntary and involuntary reasons: for the purpose
of abstraction, to focus computational resources on ‘more
relevant’ facts, by gradually things slipping from the mind,
or because information is received that all beliefs about that
fact are unreliable. Becoming unaware can also be modelled
by a bisimulation quantification, and we have pictured this
as well in Figure 1.
Becoming aware of other agents: And apart from
becoming aware of a fact, an agent can also become aware
of another agent in the system, and of the uncertainties of
that agent about facts (and about other agents, including
the observing agent). In other words, not all agents may be
visible to a given agent at a given moment. We provide a
similar operation for ‘the agent becomes aware of agent i’,
including its dual where visible agents slip into oblivion: ‘the
agent becomes unware of (forgets) agent i’. This employs
bisimulation quantification over an agent variable—an idea
originally proposed in [13] as far as we know, but so far not
employed in dynamic epistemics.
Figure 2 gives an example. The initial state of information
is a slight adjustment of the previous example, as there is
now another agent j as well, of which agent i is unaware and
who is knowledgable about p. (But who is not introspective,
as he is not aware of himself.) The figure depicts how agent
i can become aware of agent j, and also the dual option of
forgetting. The unaware atoms and agents are in parentheses.
An arrow with two agent variables stands for two arrows.
¬p(q) p(q)
¬p(q)
i
j
ij ij
ij
¬p(q) p(q)ii(j) i(j)
agent i becomes aware of agent j
agent i forgets agent j
Figure 2. Agent i becomes aware of and forget about other agent j. On
the right, if agent j knows that p is false, he is uncertain if agent i knows
that.
So far, the examples addressed change of awareness that
is the same for all states and for all agents. We call this
public global awareness. But awareness change can also
be different for each agent (individual global awareness),
and even in each state (individual local awareness, the
common assumption in works like [2]). We present natural
generalizations of our ideas to those settings.
Implicit and explicit knowledge: We did not distinguish
the modeller becoming aware of new facts or agents from
the agents gaining that awareness. This is because we see
‘becoming aware’ as a structural refinement, where our
starting point is an initial minimal structure. ‘Unaware’
means ‘don’t care’, and we are not interested in the struc-
ture of unawareness. This seems to be different from a
typical economist’s perspective, where the focus is more
on unawarenes than on awareness [3], [12]. It also has as
unintended consequence that the usual distinction between
implicit and explicit knowledge is meaningless in our setting.
Explicit knowledge is implicit knowledge of concepts of
which you are aware. In the initial two-state structure in
Figure 1 agent i implicitly knows q. After becoming aware of
q, he has become explicitly ignorant about q! In other words,
becoming aware does not mean that implicit knowledge will
become explicit, an intuitively appealing requirement for
awareness change. (Despite this, we have chosen to let the
standard distinction persist in our approach as a simplifying
technical device.)
In case this is seen as a restriction: we can overcome
the restriction in two steps. First, instead of bisimulation
quantification, the dynamics that we present could with some
reason also be based on Fine’s propositional quantification
[9] (this might even have advantages for the axiomatization).
This only changes the denotation of the propositional vari-
able, without changing anything else of the model structure.
This does not solve the problem yet, clearly. Second, suppose
we now as well disallow propositional quantification but
only allow moving variables around from unaware to aware
and vice versa: this keeps all factual and epistemic structure
of our models constant, and, presto, all implicit knowledge
can now become explicit. That this can be accomplished
so easily we see as a real advantage of our framework:
it provides tools to model awareness change and can be
tailored according to modellers’ needs and system require-
ments. Figure 3 pictures agent i becoming aware of q such
that her implicit knowledge that p and q are not both true
becomes explicit:
¬p¬q p¬q
¬pq
i
i i
i i
i
¬p(¬q) p(¬q)
¬p(q)
i
i i
i i
i agent i becomes aware of fact q
agent i forgets fact q
Figure 3. Making implicit knowledge explicit
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Awareness and information: The logics for change of
awareness combine well with logics for change of knowl-
edge [14]. A typical example is the announcement of a fact p
of which the agents were unaware. The announcer addresses
an issue, the truth about p, simultaneously with revealing the
truth about that issue. A surprising result is that arbitrarily
complex informational change (private announcements, sus-
picions, ...: in fact anything representable by an action model
[15]) can be seen as the public announcement of a true fact
of which the agents were unaware. For lack of space, this
matter will not be addressed in here, see [1] for the (isolated)
result.
Quantifying over awareness change: We should em-
phasize that our logics model quantification over all possible
ways in which an agent can become aware of a concept (i.e.,
fact or other agent), but do not model specific awareness
change. In other words, it is not important how the agent
gained this awareness. Or in yet other words, it is a logic
about speculation over all future scenarios if we were to
become aware of some relevant facts or other players later.
But surely, any conclusions that can be drawn from that
already are of great interest not just to academic pursuits of
economics but also, currently, to the real economy.
In Section II we introduce epistemic awareness models
wherein knowledge and awareness are encoded. An appro-
priately expanded notion of bisimulation is also introduced
there (apart from atoms, back, and forth, there is a fourth
clause involving awareness). In Section III we present the
Logic of Public Global Awareness (LPGA) and the language
L0: the awareness of facts and other agents at a given
moment is the same for all agents. In Section IV we present
the Logic of Individual Global Awareness (LIGA) and the
language L: the level of awareness can vary between agents,
but is the same in all states. In Section V we summarily
present the Logic of Individual Local Awareness (LILA)
(also based on L), wherein for each agent and each state
the level of awareness may vary, and some issues for further
research.
II. STRUCTURES
Given are a countably infinite set of propositional vari-
ables (facts) P and a countably infinite set of agents N . As
we are also modelling ‘becoming aware of an agent’, any
finite number of agents would be insufficient: whatever the
finite number of agents in one’s company, someone else can
always turn up at any stage! The sets P and N are disjoint.
The union P ∪N is called the set of concepts. Propositional
variables are named p, q, r, possibly indexed or quoted, and
agent variables are named i, j, k, possibly indexed or quoted.
For any set X , write X + x for X ∪ {x} and write X − x
for X \ {x}. Write Y for X \ Y and similarly x for X − x.
Epistemic awareness model: An epistemic awareness
model M = (S,R,A, V ) for N and P consists of a domain
S of (factual) states (or ‘worlds’), an accessibility function
R : N → P(S × S), an awareness function A : N → S →
P(P ∪ N) and a valuation function V : P → P(S). For
R(i) we write Ri and for A(i) we write Ai; accessibility
function R can be seen as a set of accessibility relations
Ri, and V as a set of valuations V (p). A pointed epistemic
awareness model (M, s) is an epistemic awareness state.
Given an agent i and a state s, a fact in Ai(s) (i.e., an
element of Ai(s) ∩ P ) is called relevant (for that agent,
given that state), and a fact in P \Ai(s) is called irrelevant.
Similarly, an agent in Ai(s) is called visible, and an agent
in N \ Ai(s) is called invisible.
The awareness function A satisfies public global aware-
ness iff the value of A is the same for all agents and for
all states. Slightly abusing the (mathematical) language, we
then write A(S) for the set of (globally) relevant facts and
visible agents. The awareness function A satisfies individual
global awareness iff the awareness is the same in all states,
but maybe different between agents. We then write Ai(S)
for the set of (globally) relevant facts and visible agents for
that agent. If the awareness may be different for all agents
and in all states (the usual assumption in the literature) we
call it individual local awareness.
Epistemic uncertainty over awareness is commonly ruled
out (there are exceptions, such as [12]): an agent is sup-
posed to know whether she is aware of a fact or of
another agent. This condition corresponds to the property
on epistemic awareness models of no uncertain awareness
defined as (universal quantification over all variables in)
“If (s, t), (s, u) ∈ Ri, then Ai(t) = Ai(u).” If Ri is an
equivalence relation (to interpret knowledge of an agent),
then, if ‘no uncertain awareness’ is satisfied, the partition
induced by Ri on the domain is a refinement of the partition
induced by Ai.
Given an epistemic awareness model (M, s) with aware-
ness function A, we write (M, s)Ai+p for the model that
is like (M, s) except for its awareness function A′ for
which we have A′i(s) = Ai(s) + p. When ‘no uncertain
awareness’ holds we assume that p is added for all states
in i’s equivalence class, when ‘individual global awareness’
holds we assume that p is added for all states in the model,
and for ‘public global’ conditions we write (M, s)A+p.
Similarly for (M, s)Ai+p, and for (M, s)Ai−p (to be used
in a definition for forgetting), etc.
Bisimulation: Let two models M = (S,R,A, V ) and
M ′ = (S′, R′,A′, V ′) be given. A non-empty relation R ⊆
S × S′ is a bisimulation, iff for all s ∈ S and s′ ∈ S′ with
(s, s′) ∈ R:
atoms s ∈ V (p) iff s′ ∈ V ′(p) for all p ∈ P ;
aware for all i ∈ N , Ai(s) = A′i(s′);
forth for all i ∈ N and t ∈ S, if Ri(s, t) then there is a
t′ ∈ S′ such that Ri(s′, t′) and (t, t′) ∈ R;
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back for all i ∈ N and t′ ∈ S′, if Ri(s′, t′) then there
is a t ∈ S such that Ri(s, t) and (t, t′) ∈ R.
We write (M, s)↔(M ′, s′), iff there is a bisimulation be-
tween M and M ′ linking s and s′, and we call (M, s) and
(M ′, s′) bisimilar. The novelty of our definition is the clause
aware, that requires that bisimilar states have the same level
of awareness.
A bisimulation except for fact p satisfies atoms for P −p,
and aware to the extent that Ai(s) − p = Ai(s′) − p.
The value of p may vary, including uncertainty of the
agents about p and about each other’s uncertainty, and the
agents may have different awareness of fact p. We write
(M, s)↔p(M
′, s′), and R|p (the index / restriction makes
the subset explicit for which the bisimulation should hold).
A bisimulation except for agent i satisfies back and forth for
N − i, and aware to the extent that Ai(s)− i = Ai(s′)− i.
The accessibility relation and awareness for agent i may
vary, including uncertainty of other agents about i’s un-
certainty and awareness. We write (M, s)↔i(M ′, s′), and
R|i. The notion of restricted bisimilarity and its notation
generalize in the obvious way to more facts and agents, also
in combination.
Awareness bisimulation: The notion of bisimulation
will be exactly what we need to capture awareness change
under conditions of public global and individual global
awareness. It is also effective under conditions of individual
local awareness, but in that case too restrictive—now we
need a coarser notion of structural similarity to cover all
different ways in which an agent can become aware of
facts or agents. (After the definition and introduction now
to follow, this more complex notion will only be used in
Section V.)
Consider the following example: in the actual state s agent
i is aware of agent j and of fact p, and state t is i-accessible
from the actual state. In state t, agent j is aware of p and
q. That agent j is also aware of q should leave agent i
indifferent, as she was not aware of q in the actual state.
Therefore, in case agent i were to become aware of q in
state s, she should consider it possible that j is unaware of
q in that i-accessible state t. Under conditions of public or
individual global awareness this is not a variation we care
to consider: if j is aware of q in t, then he is already aware
of q in the actual state s. Clearly, we do not want to change
the value of atoms of which agents are aware in the actual
state.
This sort of similarity is captured in the following notion,
named awareness bisimulation. If two models are aware-
ness bisimilar, they cannot be distinguished (as we will
see later) by the fragment of the language of which the
agents are aware: therefore, they are described by the same
explicit knowledge. The notion is somewhat involved, and
strictly based on the pointed versions of our structures.
In the following, we use the notational abbreviation A(s)
for λi.Ai(s), and the abbrevation N(s) for the set of
all agents of which some agent is aware in state s, i.e.,
{j ∈ N | there is an k ∈ N such that j ∈ Ak(s)}.
Let epistemic awareness states (M,u) =
((S,R,A, V ), u) and (M ′, u′) = ((S′, R′,A′, V ′), u′)
be given. A non-empty relation RA ⊆ S × S′ (where A
in RA stands for ‘aware’) is an awareness bisimulation
between (M,u) and (M ′, u′), notation (M,u)↔A(M ′, u′),
iff (u, u′) ∈ RA and RA =
⋂
j∈N(u) R
A
j [A(u)]. We
continue by defining RAj [A′′] for any A′′ : N → P(P ∪N)
(write A′′i for A′′(i)). Let such a A′′ be given, s ∈ S, and
s′ ∈ S′, then (s, s′) ∈ RAj [A′′] iff:
atoms s ∈ V (p) iff s′ ∈ V ′(p) for all p ∈ A′′j ;
aware for all i ∈ A′′j , Ai(s) ∩ A′′j = A′i(s′) ∩ A′′j ;
forth for all i ∈ A′′j and t ∈ S, if Ri(s, t) then there is a
t′ ∈ S′ such that Ri(s′, t′) and (t, t′) ∈ RAj [A′′ ∩
A′(t)];
back for all i ∈ A′′j and t′ ∈ S′, if Ri(s′, t′) then there
is a t ∈ S such that Ri(s, t) and (t, t′) ∈ RAj [A′′∩
A′(t)].
In the back and forth clauses, the relation RAj [A′′ ∩A′(t)]
is inductively assumed to be already defined. Note that
R
A
j [A
′′ ∩ A′(t)] is a function from the set of agents
to a possibly smaller subset of facts and agents than in
R
A
j [A
′′], and that these functions are downwardly closed:
if A′′j = ∅, then RAj [A′′] = ∅. In finite multi-S5 structures
a stable point will be finitely reached in any chain where
R
A
j [A
′′ ∩ A′(t)] = RAj [A
′′]. The relation RA is indeed an
equivalence (proof omitted).
The relation between bisimulation and awareness bisimu-
lation is now as follows. (i) For the model class satisfying
public global awareness, awareness bisimulation reverts to
bisimulation by way of R|A(S) = RA. (ii) For the model
class satisfying individual global awareness we have instead
that R|Ai(S) = RAi [λi.Ai(S)], from which directly follows
that RA is the intersection of all R|Ai(S) such that some
agent is aware of i somewhere—similarly to above, let N(S)
stand for the set of agents of which some agent is aware
in some state:
⋂
i∈N(S) R|Ai(S) = R
A
. (iii) Otherwise,
as already mentioned, R is a refinement of RA. (Proofs
omitted.)
III. PUBLIC GLOBAL AWARENESS
Language: Given are a countably infinite set of propo-
sitional variables (facts) P , and a countably infinite set of
agents N . The language L0 of public global awareness is
defined as
ϕ ::= p | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ¬ϕ | Kiϕ | ∃pϕ | ∃iϕ | Aϕ
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where p ∈ P and i ∈ N . By notational abbreviation are
defined:
⊤ = ∃p(p ∨ ¬p)
K˙iϕ = Aϕ ∧Kiϕ
∃˙pϕ = ¬Ap ∧ ∃p(ϕ ∧Ap)
∃˙iϕ = ¬AKi⊤ ∧ ∃i(ϕ ∧AKi⊤)
˙`pϕ = Ap ∧ ∃p(ϕ ∧ ¬Ap)
˙` iϕ = AKi⊤ ∧ ∃i(ϕ ∧ ¬AKi⊤)
Construct Kiϕ stands for ‘agent i implicitly knows ϕ’. We
already pointed out in the introduction that this is a rather
tentative phrasing in our setting. Construct Aϕ stands for
‘the agents are aware of ϕ’, or rather more strictly, looking
ahead to our semantics: ‘the visible agents are collectively
aware of ϕ’. The curiously non-standard definition of ⊤ is to
make explicit knowledge of truth possible even if all facts are
irrelevant. The meaning of the bisimulation quantifications
∃pϕ and ∃iϕ is less intuitive than that of their counterparts
that were introduced by abbreviation:
K˙iϕ agent i (explicitly) knows ϕ
∃˙pϕ after the agents become aware of fact p, ϕ
∃˙iϕ after the agents become aware of agent i, ϕ
˙`pϕ after the agents forget fact p, ϕ
˙` iϕ after the agents forget agent i, ϕ
Let us explain one of these abbrevations. Explicit awareness
∃˙pϕ is defined as ¬Ap ∧ ∃p(ϕ ∧ Ap), which says that the
agents are currently not aware of fact p, and there is a way
to vary the valuation and the awareness of the p, such that
afterwards ϕ is true and the agents are aware of fact p.
We have to distinguish universal from existential readings
of becoming aware: ∃p says that ‘there is a way to become
aware of p after which ...’, but we need ∀p for ‘after any
way to become aware of p ...’.
The semantics of the awareness operator A will be purely
syntax-based, namely using the free variables of a formula.
These are defined as follows (note that var (ϕ) ⊆ P ∪ N ):
var (p) = {p}, var(ϕ ∧ψ) = var (ϕ) ∪ var(ψ), var(¬ϕ) =
var (ϕ), var(Kiϕ) = var (ϕ) + i, var(∃pϕ) = var(ϕ) − p,
var (∃iϕ) = var(ϕ) − i, and var (Aϕ) = var(ϕ).
Semantics: Let M = (S,R,A, V ) be given. We remind
the reader that the function A in the case of public global
awareness is constant for all agents and for all states, and that
we write A(S) for the set of relevant facts and visible agents.
Below, let the models M ′ have the structure (S′, R′,A′, V ′).
(M, s) |= p iff s ∈ V (p)
(M, s) |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff (M, s) |= ϕ and (M, s) |= ψ
(M, s) |= ¬ϕ iff (M, s) 6|= ϕ
(M, s) |= Kiϕ iff for all t : (s, t) ∈ Ri ⇒ (M, t) |= ϕ
(M, s) |= ∃pϕ iff there is a (M ′, s′) such that
(M, s)↔p(M ′, s′) and (M ′, s′) |= ϕ
(M, s) |= ∃iϕ iff there is a (M ′, s′) such that
(M, s)↔i(M
′, s′) and (M ′, s′) |= ϕ
(M, s) |= Aϕ iff var(ϕ) ⊆ A(S)
The set of validities (and the logic) is called LPGA
(Logic of Public Global Awareness). The semantics of all
these operators, including Kiϕ, ∃pϕ, and Aϕ, is nearly
perfectly standard—except for the additional bisimulation
requirement with respect to the awareness function. They
are the usual suspects—and bring their usual advantages
and disadvantages. We could have made different choices. In
particular we could have hardwired ‘becoming aware’ into
the semantics just as for explicit knowledge.
We can now explain the curious awareness clauses in
becoming aware of and forgetting about other agents. Con-
sider ˙` iϕ (the agents forget about agent i) which stands
for AKi⊤∧∃i(ϕ∧¬AKi⊤). The requirement AKi⊤ states
that the agent must currently be aware of that agent i for the
forgetting to be able to take place. Well, that seems to make
sense, you cannot forget something that you are not aware of
in the first place. We can pin down that the agents are aware
of p by any formula containing the i somewhere (except
when bound by a quantifier). But we cannot take, e.g., the
formula AKip for just any fact p, as the agents may not be
aware of that atom. The requirement AKip would then be
false, even if the agents are aware of i! By choosing AKi⊤
this is avoided: using the notational abbreviation for ⊤ this
stands for AKi∃p(p ∨ ¬p), and the set of free variables of
this formula is just {i}; the formula Ki∃p(p∨¬p) expresses
that agent i knows that, if the agents (including i therefore)
were to become aware of p, tautologies involving it would
by all means be true.
Example: Figure 1 models that the agents (namely
agent i) become aware of q. Initially, the agent is only
aware of p. We can now check in the semantics that
all of the following hold throughout the initial model:
Ap,¬Aq, ∃˙qK˙i¬(p ∨ q). The two models in the figure are
bisimilar except for fact q. In Figure 2 we have that in the
initial model, in the (left) state where p is false and relevant
and q is true and irrelevant, ∃jKj¬p → ¬KjKi¬p is true:
after the agents become aware of j, then if that agent knows
that p is false he is uncertain whether agent i knows that.
Figure 3 illustrates how implicit knowledge can only become
explicit, according to the simpler proposal to follow.
Axiomatization and theory: We have not axiomatized
the logic yet, although we have a list of tentative axioms.
Among the more obvious principles are ∀p p ↔ ⊥ and
∀p q ↔ q, for q 6= p. Here we encounter the disadvantages
of taking along the usual suspects: bisimulation quantified
logics are known to be hard to axiomatize. But they have
other desirable theoretical properties that are easier to get.
We think it is feasible to show that the logic LPGA is
decidable, via a translation into the µ-calculus, employing
the techniques of [13]. We also consider the axiomatization
with respect to the multi S5 models, where Kiϕ indeed
stands for knowledge of ϕ, as usual.
Variations: implicit and explicit knowledge: We recall
that in this semantics an agent may know ϕ implicitly, but
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may not get to know ϕ explicitly. Consider the semantics
again for becoming aware, now (mere semantic sugar)
expressed directly:
(M, s) |= ∃˙pϕ iff there is a (M ′, s′) such that
(M, s)↔p(M
′, s′), A′(S) = A(S) + p, and
(M ′, s′) |= ϕ.
Consider propositional quantification a` la Fine, tentatively
expressed with ≡p—as this does not allow variation in
awareness we must express that directly in the resulting
model:
(M, s) |= ∃˙pϕ iff there is a (M ′, s′) such that
(M, s) ≡p (M ′, s′) and (M ′, s′)A+p |= ϕ.
Now remove even the Fine quantification and we get
(M, s) |= ∃˙pϕiff there is a (M ′, s′) such that
(M, s) = (M ′, s′) and (M ′, s′)A+p |= ϕ.
in other words:
(M, s) |= ∃˙pϕ iff (M, s)A+p |= ϕ
In the last, all implicit knowledge wherein only p was
unaware has become explicit.
Variations: forgetting: Continuing on the theme of
variations, it seems that bisimulation quantification is es-
sential when becoming awaring but not so when forgetting.
Then, the simpler ‘reassignment of awareness’ version as
used just now always suffices. Suppose that forgetting were
also a primitive in the language. Then we can define,
straightforwardly:
(M, s) |= `pϕ iff (M, s)A−p |= ϕ
Variations: speculative knowledge: Finally, consider a
version KAi of the knowledge operator defined as follows:
KAi ϕ iff ∀var(ϕ)Kiϕ
In other words, ϕ may contain several facts and agents of
which the agent is currently unaware, but no matter how she
becomes aware of that she will still (explicitly) know that
ϕ. (var(ϕ) contains all agent and propositional variables
in ϕ, also—what we haven’t stated but what can be easily
proved—successively becoming aware of facts and agents is
commutative, therefore ∀x∀y can be identified with ∀{x, y},
and so on for any finite subset.)
In the economics literature this—tentatively called—
speculative knowledge KA seems often confused with im-
plicit knowledge. You, agent i who is aware of agent j and
fact p but unaware of fact q, may speculatively know that:
q∨¬q, or (assuming knowledge) Kjq → q, or p∧ q → p. If
q were ever to become known, anything involving it derived
from validities will become true. On the other hand, q may
be implicitly known, but clearly not speculatively.
IV. INDIVIDUAL GLOBAL AWARENESS
Language: The difference with the language L0 for
public global awareness is that the operators ∃ and A are
now relative to an agent. The language for individual aware-
ness serves both the logic of individual global awareness
LIGA and the logic of individual local awareness LILA,
to be introduced in the next section.
The language L of individual awareness is defined as
ϕ ::= p | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ¬ϕ | Kiϕ | ∃ipϕ | ∃iiϕ | Aiϕ
where p ∈ P and i ∈ N . The abbreviations for explicit
knowledge and awareness now are
K˙iϕ = Aiϕ ∧Kiϕ
∃˙ipϕ = ¬Aip ∧ ∃ip(ϕ ∧Aiϕ)
∃˙ijϕ = ¬AiKj⊤ ∧ ∃ij(ϕ ∧AiKj⊤)
˙`
ipϕ = Aip ∧ ∃ip(ϕ ∧ ¬Aip)
˙`
ijϕ = AiKj⊤ ∧ ∃ij(ϕ ∧ ¬AiKj⊤)
Formula ∃˙ipϕ stands for ‘after (some way in which) agent
i becomes aware of atom p, ϕ’, and Aiϕ stands for ‘agent
i is aware of ϕ’, etc. The free variables of a formula in
L are defined as before with different clauses var (∃ipϕ) =
var (ϕ)+i−p, var(∃ijϕ) = var (ϕ)+i−j, and var (Aiϕ) =
var (ϕ) + i.
Semantics: For each agent, its awareness of other
agents and facts is the same throughout a model, and as
already introduced we use shorthand Ai(S) for the subset
of the relevant facts and visible agents for agent i. One could
consider further constraints such as self-awareness, ‘for all
i ∈ N , i ∈ Ai(S)’, but we do not require that, as we prefer
to keep our approach as general as possible. The crucial
clauses in the semantics are as follows (agent forgetting is
similar).
(M, s) |= ∃ipϕ iff there is a (M ′, s′) such that :
(M, s)↔i(M
′, s′), (M, s)↔p(M
′, s′)
and (M ′, s′) |= ϕ
(M, s) |= ∃ijϕ iff there is a (M ′, s′) such that :
(M, s)↔i(M
′, s′), (M, s)↔j(M
′, s′)
and (M ′, s′) |= ϕ
(M, s) |= Aiϕ iff var (ϕ) ⊆ Ai(S)
The set of validities (and the logic) is called LIGA (Logic
of Individual Global Awareness). The semantics for ∃˙ipϕ
amounts to the requirement that in (M, s) (there is a way
such that), after agent i becomes aware of p, ϕ is true,
if and only if ϕ remains true in (M ′, s′) for all agents
except i and for all atoms except p. Note that this is a
stronger requirement than (M, s)↔j,p(M ′, s′)! Suppose the
latter were the case, and let q 6= p. M ′ may now differ
for agent i in the value of q—and that would be awkward
if i were already aware of q... But if it is required that
(M, s)↔i(M
′, s′) and that (M, s)↔p(M ′, s′) this sort of
eventuality is ruled out.
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There are open questions on the relation between the
logics LPGA and LIGA. For example, it is unclear if
Aϕ (public awareness!) can be expressed in L, as the
obvious infinitary conjunction ∧i∈N Aiϕ is not a formula
in the language. As the current agents may always become
aware of yet another agent, we cannot restrict the set of all
agents to a finite set. We do not know of a logic with our
intuitive requirement that the set of agents must be infinite.
We have not yet explored the axiomatization of this logic
LIGA of individual global awareness—it suffers from the
same backdraws for bisimulation quantifiers as LPGA. All
variations discussed under LPGA apply here too.
V. INDIVIDUAL LOCAL AWARENESS – AND FURTHER
RESEARCH
We now move to the most complex stage of awareness
change. A first observation is that we can keep the same
language L and even the same semantics for the operators
as there. The difference is that it applies to a larger class
of models, therefore the change of awareness allowed in
the bisimulation variation ‘except for variable p’ need no
longer be global, for all states in the model, but may now be
‘almost’ local: in the actual state only. Almost: in accordance
with the conventions proposed in Section II, ‘no uncertain
awareness’ is an invariant, so, e.g. when the accessibility is
an equivalence relation, we only may change the awareness
of p in all states of the agent’s actual equivalence class
(or, therefore, across a union of such classes). So we have
a logic LILA for individual local awareness change. As
also said in Section II, the variation allowed by the part
(M, s)↔p(M ′, s′) is now too restrictive, and we need to
employ more in full the freedom for local variation for
other agents. This can be expressed with our alternative
notion, of awareness bisimulation. The corresponding basic
construct for becoming aware is ∃Ai pϕ, with an upper index
to distinguish it from the previous ∃ipϕ, where the A
expresses that it is interpreted using RA. Its semantics is:
(M, s) |= ∃Ai pϕ iff there is a (M ′, s′) such that
(M, s)↔A(M ′, s′) and (M ′, s′)Ai+p |= ϕ
This says that (there is a way in which) the agent i becomes
aware of atom p in the current state if there is a model
similar to the current one in all its observable aspects except
that fact p is added to the awareness set for that agent
in all states accessible for that agent from actual states s′
(in accordance with ‘no uncertain awareness’). Given the
relation between bisimulation and awareness bisimulation
at the end of Section II we think we can easily obtain
the following results—but honesty requires us to admit that
the submission rush did not give us time to reassuringly
prove them (for the second, it is helpful to understand
how the combined requirement of (M, s)↔i(M ′, s′) and
(M, s)↔j(M
′, s′) is a special case of (M, s)↔A(M ′, s′),
given individual global awareness):
• Awareness bisimilar structures satisfy the same explicit
knowledge:
If (M, s)↔A(M ′, s′), then (M, s) |= K˙iϕ iff
(M, s) |= K˙iϕ for all ϕ ∈ L.
• Given individual global awareness, ∃ip and ∃Ai p are
(explicitly) indistinguishable:
If (M, s) |= ¬Aip ∧ Ai∃ipϕ, then (M, s) |= ∃ipϕ iff
(M, s) |= ∃Ai pϕ.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The results in this paper are: (i) the logics LPGA and
LIGA, (ii) a way to model agents becoming aware of other
agents, (iii) an integrated approach for becoming aware and
forgetting, and (iv) the definition of awareness bisimulation:
we clearly have not yet explored the use of the latter to the
full, but we think this might prove a very useful notion for
the community to explore awareness dynamics.
The logics may not be more expressive than epistemic
logic. Adding a transitive operator such as common knowl-
edge would greatly increase the expressivity, without losing
decidability. The logics seem suited to succinctly express
difficult concepts in economics concerning awareness and
unawareness. As with anything involving second-order quan-
tification, an axiomatization will remain a challenge —
but we consider the dynamic semantics of awareness of
sufficient, independent, interest, in particular in view of
relations with economics. Integration of logics for awareness
change with logics for information change is very promising.
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